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I.  Introduction 
 
 In the spring of 2003, as a first year student at Michigan State University College of 
Law, I had an assignment from my Research, Writing and Advocacy class to watch an appellate 
proceeding.  I perused the Case Call for the Michigan Supreme Court and found that an 
insurance related case was to be before the Court on March 11.  I have worked in the insurance 
industry both as a claims adjuster and an agent since 1989, so I felt I would more likely 
understand the issues in that case than in the other cases.  The case was Wilkie v. Auto-Owners 
Insurance Company; Docket 1192951. 
 Having worked in the insurance industry, I was familiar with the terms “adhesion 
contract” and “construing ambiguous terms against the drafter.”  However, much of the oral 
argument and questions from the bench focused on the “doctrine of reasonable expectations.”  It 
was a concept I had never heard of before as I had yet to take a Contracts class.2 
 Wilkie not only clarified Michigan’s position on the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, but also has formed a basis, through Rory v. Continental Ins. Co3, to repudiate any 
special interpretive rules regarding insurance contracts.  This paper will review the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Wilkie, review the positions for and against the doctrine, compare 
Michigan’s stance to other jurisdictions, and propose that Rory is not the logical extension of 
Wilkie, but can be distinguished.  A contrary holding in Rory can stand with the holding in 
Wilkie. 
 
II.  Michigan Rejects the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations 
 
 Wilkie involved the limits of underinsured motorist coverage.  Paul K. Wilkie and Janna 
L. Frank were involved in an automobile accident with Stephen Ward.  Ward crossed the center 
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line of the road and collided with the vehicle driven by Frank in which Wilkie was a passenger.  
Wilkie, who was the owner of the vehicle, died from his injuries, and Frank was seriously 
injured.4 
 Ward’s vehicle was insured with an auto policy from Citizen’s Insurance with a single 
liability limit of $50,000 for Liability Coverage.  This single limit was shared between Wilkie’s 
estate and Frank with each receiving $25,000.5  Wilkie’s vehicle was insured by Auto-Owners 
and had Underinsured Motorist Coverage with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per 
occurrence.6 
 There was no debate that Ward caused the accident and that Wilkie’s and Frank’s 
claims satisfied the threshold requirement to receive compensatory damages under Michigan’s 
No-Fault statute,7 and that each of their claims exceeded $100,000.  Auto-Owners contended that 
it owed Wilkie and Frank $50,000 each.  As it understood the terms of the contract, the $100,000 
per person limit was reduced by the amount of coverage that would be available to Ward on a per 
person basis, $50,000.8  Wilkie and Frank claimed that Auto-Owners owed each of them 
$75,000.  They argued that the $100,000 should be reduced by the amount they actually received 
from Citizen’s, $25,000.9 
 Wilkie and Frank sought declaratory relief and moved for summary disposition based 
on their understanding of the policy.  The trial court granted their motion and ruled that Auto-
Owners owed them $75,000 each.10 
 Auto-Owners appealed and the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s 
granting of Wilkie and Frank’s motion.11  The court held that the term “available” was 
ambiguous and, consistent with ambiguities being construed against the drafter of the contract, 
held for the plaintiffs.12 
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 The Court of Appeals, unnecessarily13, stated that Auto-Owners’ interpretation of the 
contract also violated the rule of reasonable expectations,14 which was “[c]oncomitant with the 
rules of construction . . . .  When determining the existence or extent of coverage under the rule 
of reasonable expectations, a court examines whether a policyholder, upon reading the contract, 
was led to reasonably expect coverage.”15  The court concluded that, “[t]he reasonable 
expectation would be that the insured has contracted to have the amount of the policy limits 
available to him, whether paid by the underinsured motorist, or by the insured’s policy.”16  The 
balance of the opinion is an ambiguity analysis and reference to the rule of reasonable 
expectations is limited to two paragraphs.17 
 In overturning the Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the policy 
language was not ambiguous.  The Court stated that since the Underinsured Motorist Coverage 
limit was $100,000, and the total of all bodily injury policies available to Ward was $50,000, the 
policy clearly limited each plaintiff’s recovery to $50,000.18  Any ambiguity that there may be in 
the term “available” in paragraph 4(a)(1) of the policy is settled when read with paragraphs 
4(b)(2) and (3), which state that the amounts paid will not be increased because of the number of 
persons injured or claims brought.19 
 Having found the policy language to be unambiguous, the Court dispensed with the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations in a lengthy analysis that started with its statement of fidelity 
to the freedom of contract.  According to the Court, the doctrine is the antithesis of the notion of 
freedom of contract.  “This approach, where judges divine the parties’ reasonable expectations 
and then rewrite the contract accordingly, is contrary to the bedrock principle of American 
contract law that parties are free to contract as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the 
agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of 
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law or public policy.”20  As opposed to the foundational limitation on the government’s ability to 
restrict the freedom of contract,21 the Court characterized the rule of reasonable expectations as 
being of recent origin, beginning with a 1970 article by then Professor Robert E. Keeton,22 which 
spawned a “frontal assault on the ability of our citizens to manage, by contract, their own affairs . 
. . .”23 
 The Court recited what it termed Michigan’s “puzzling history” with the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations, starting with Zurich Ins. Co. v. Rombough.24  The doctrine is addressed 
positively in what the Wilkie Court termed as dicta.25  Twelve years later the Court discussed the 
doctrine in Raska v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co.26  The Raska Court strongly rejected the position that 
an unambiguous contract can be overcome by the reasonable expectations of the insured. 
[T]he expectation that a contract will be enforceable other than according to 
its terms surely may not be said to be reasonable.  If a person signs a contract 
without reading all of it or without understanding it, under some 
circumstances that person can avoid its obligations on the theory that there 
was no contract at all for there was no meeting of the minds. 
 
But to allow such a person to bind another to an obligation not covered by the 
contract as written because the first person thought the other was bound to 
such an obligation is neither reasonable nor just.27 
 
Interestingly, in his dissent in Raska, the only Michigan authority Justice Williams uses in 
support of the doctrine of reasonable expectations is Rombough.28 
 Four years after Raska, a plurality of the Court decided Powers v. DAIIE.29  As the 
Wilkie Court observed, the Powers plurality cited Raska for the proposition that if an insured 
read a contract, their reasonable expectations would be enforced, which is interesting considering 
Raska’s repudiation of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.30  For the first time, the Powers 
plurality recognized that an ambiguity in the policy language was not required for the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations to apply.31  Powers has been cited for the proposition that Michigan had 
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been using reasonable expectations language for the interpretation of insurance contracts.32  
However, it has been criticized as applying the doctrine, but not holding to the basis of the 
doctrine.33 
 Five years later in Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Clark,34 the Court agreed with the Powers 
plurality that the doctrine of reasonable expectations was an adjunct to the rules of contract 
interpretation, but did not follow the Powers Court’s view that the doctrine did not need an 
ambiguity to be applicable.35  That view was also rejected in Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Nikkel.36 
 Thus, the Wilkie Court described Michigan’s history with the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations as a “confused jumble of ignored precedent, silently acquiesced to plurality 
opinions, and dicta, all of which, with little scrutiny, have been piled on each other to establish 
authority.”37  The Court took to clear up the status of the doctrine of reasonable expectations in 
Michigan.38 
 The Court summarily rejected the notion that the doctrine would be applicable to 
unambiguous policy language, and applying it to ambiguous policy language would add nothing 
to the maxim contra preferentem.39 
In sum, the rule of reasonable expectations clearly has no application when 
interpreting an unambiguous contract because a policyholder cannot be said to 
have reasonably expected something different from the clear language of the 
contract.  Further, it is already well established that ambiguous language 
should be construed against the drafter, i.e., the insurer.  Therefore, stating 
that ambiguous language should be interpreted in favor of the policyholder’s 
reasonable expectations adds nothing to the way in which Michigan courts 
construe contracts, and thus the rule of reasonable expectations should be 
abolished.40 
 
 Justice Weaver concurred with the majority that the doctrine of reasonable expectations 
was not applicable when interpreting unambiguous policy language, but dissented on the basis 
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that she thought the policy language was ambiguous.41  However, she did not say that the 
doctrine was not applicable in the case of ambiguous policy language.  Even though she only 
used contra preferentem as the basis for her dissent, I believe she would still use the doctrine to 
interpret ambiguous policy language.42 
 Justice Cavanagh in dissent argued that the doctrine of reasonable expectations is not 
limited to circumstances where the policy language is ambiguous on its face and can be used to 
make the ambiguity determination.43  In the realm of contracts of adhesion, the court should look 
not only at the text of the contract, but also at the circumstances surrounding the transaction to 
determine the objectively reasonable expectations of the insured.44  “I would prefer not to 
disregard the manner in which the insurance industry operates.  Though an adhesion contract 
may be a necessary ingredient in the trade, I cannot condone a doctrine of interpretation that all 
but ignores the potentially precarious effect on the bound party.”45 
 In looking at the policy language from the insured’s perspective, Justice Cavanagh 
determined that it can be construed to mean that the term “available” applies to the amount of 
coverage available to the tortfeasor to pay each claim.  Therefore, the calculation should be to 
subtract the $25,000 each plaintiff received from the $100,000 limit of underinsured motorist 
coverage to determine Auto-Owners’ obligation.  Since this interpretation is objectively 
reasonable, the policy language is ambiguous and should be construed against the drafter.46 
 Justice Kelly in dissent agreed with Justice Cavanagh’s approval of the rule of 
reasonable expectations.  She found that the simple dictionary definition of “available” could 
render the term ambiguous in a multiple claimant situation.47  Since both plaintiffs’ and Auto-
Owners’ interpretations are reasonable, the policy language is ambiguous and the language 
should be construed against the drafter.48 
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III.  Michigan Cases After Wilkie 
 While Wilkie has been used as authority regarding Michigan’s stance on the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations,49 many of the citations are for reasons other than the doctrine.50  One of 
the issues soon after Wilkie was decided was encountered in Michigan Mun. Risk Mgmt. Auth. v. 
Seaboard Surety Co.51  The case involved an unambiguous absolute pollution exclusion in the 
policy covering a contractor who was hired by the City of Westland to separate the city’s storm 
drain and sewage drain systems.52  The company negligently installed a bulkhead, which caused 
basements of nearby homes to be flooded with sewage.53  In a seemingly sympathetic statement, 
the court stated that “although the flooding problem is perhaps a foreseeable situation when 
undertaking a sewer and paving project, the contract language, and specifically the exclusion 
language, are clear and unambiguous.”54  The court held, citing Wilkie, that despite the 
unambiguous language, the trial court used the rule of reasonable expectations, which is not 
applicable.55 
 In Dahlke v. Home Owners Ins. Co.56, the Court of Appeals seemed to reluctantly 
enforce unambiguous policy language.  Dahlke involved a clear policy exclusion for damage 
caused by mold.57  In reversing the trial court’s decision, the court stated, that “[w]e are not 
unmindful of the concerns expressed to us regarding the number and breadth of listed causes of 
loss that are excluded by Home Owners’ policy.  Our interpretation of the exclusion would result 
in denial of coverage for damage to covered property that many insureds would ordinarily expect 
to be covered.”58  The court held, quoting Wilkie, that they had to apply unambiguous terms of 
the policy contract, and the insured’s reasonable expectations of coverage were not applicable.59 
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 Unionville-Sebewaing Area Schools v. MASB-SEG Prop. Cas. Pool60 found a defendant 
attempting to characterize the trial court’s decision as a use of the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations.61  The court rejected that argument stating that the trial court used principles of 
contract interpretation and found the policy sufficiently ambiguous to find against the defendant.  
The Court of Appeals agreed and upheld the trial court.62 
 In Great American Ins. Co. v. Baird,63 another defendant attempted to use Wilkie’s 
repudiation of the doctrine of reasonable expectations to exclude coverage.  Great American 
cited Wilkie for the proposition that their policy exclusion was unambiguous and that the 
insured’s reasonable expectations could not be a foundation for a finding of coverage.64  
However, the court held that the language of the policy was unambiguous in its granting of 
coverage.  Since Wilkie dictates that the plain language of the policy controls, the court found 
that the exclusion unambiguously did not preclude coverage in the facts of this case.65 
 In another pollution exclusion case, the court in Watson v. Travelers Indem. Co.66 
rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to apply the doctrine of reasonable expectations and stated that the 
exclusionary clause could easily have been discovered on examination of the policy.67  This case 
seems to stand for the position that policyholders have an obligation to read their policies.  If 
they do not, they will be held to unambiguous policy language as if they had. 
 Farm Bureau General Ins. Co. v. Palmateer68 dealt with whether the trial court 
correctly applied a contra preferentem analysis to a resident relative exclusion to the liability 
coverage in a Builders Risk policy.69  The court found that the exclusion was unambiguous, 
reversed the trial court, and remanded the case to determine whether the exclusion applied to the 
facts of the case.70  In a discussion regarding the appropriate circumstance to apply contra 
preferentem, the court parenthetically cited Wilkie for the proposition that “the rule of reasonable 
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expectations is the same as the rule of construing against the drafter and its application is limited 
to ambiguous contracts.”71  This is an interesting and inaccurate description of the holding in 
Wilkie.  Wilkie held that the rule of reasonable expectations was not applicable to unambiguous 
contracts, because the policyholder could not reasonably have expected something different from 
the clear language of the policy; and the rule added nothing to the interpretation of ambiguous 
language, since the policy would be construed against the drafter in favor of the policyholder.72  
Therefore, the rule had no application and should be abolished.73 
 Other Michigan cases cite Wilkie correctly to say that the rule of reasonable 
expectations has no applicability;74 a policyholder’s reasonable expectations are immaterial;75 
courts may not rewrite contracts on the basis of “discerned reasonable expectations” of the 
parties;76 and that a party’s reasonable expectations cannot overcome the plain language of the 
contract.77 
 An example of a gross misstatement of the holding in Wilkie is found in an argument 
made by the defendant in In re Tower Automotive, Inc.78  Defendant had moved for reargument 
on the basis that the court, in its original order, had referenced the rule of reasonable 
expectations.  The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the rule was a “principle foundation for 
the Court’s decision.”79  The court granted the motion, but only to the extent of deleting all 
reference to the rule of reasonable expectations, but otherwise confirmed the original opinion.80  
Quoting defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, the court stated, “Federal itself 
quotes Wilkie for the proposition that ‘the rule of reasonable expectations only applies when 
‘there is more than one way to reasonably interpret a contract.’’”81 
 
IV.  Keeton and the Academic Debate Over the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations 
 11
 It is well recognized that then Professor Keeton’s famous article82 was the beginning of 
the recognition of what Professor Keeton termed a “principle” of reasonable expectations.83  
Keeton started with the premise that, as opposed to contracts that are negotiated at arms length, 
insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, and therefore the unequal bargaining power 
between the insurance company and the insured make judicial regulation appropriate.84  He 
stated his now well known definition of the doctrine as follows:  The objectively reasonable 
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts 
will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated 
those expectations.85 
 The starting point is that policy language should be objectively viewed from the 
perspective of the layperson.86  Even if the particular insured made a “painstaking study of the 
contract,” as long as his expectations were objectively reasonable from the layperson’s point of 
view, those reasonable expectations would not be frustrated by contrary policy language.87 
 Keeton identified an important corollary to this expectations principle:   
[I]nsurers ought not to be allowed to use qualifications and exceptions from 
coverage that are inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of a 
policyholder having an ordinary degree of familiarity with the type of 
coverage involved.  This ought not to be allowed even though the insurer’s 
form is very explicit and unambiguous, because insurers know that ordinarily 
policyholders will not in fact read their polices.88 
 
 Timing of information seems to be important to Professor Keeton, because while he 
recognized that in most insurance transactions, the policyholder does not receive the detailed 
policy language until days or weeks after purchasing the insurance, insurers can make explicit 
coverage qualifications by notifying the policyholder of it at the time of contracting, “thereby 
negating surprise to him.”89 Professor Keeton does not explain what painstaking, as opposed to 
cursory, examination of the policy would be.  He also does not identify standards that courts can 
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use to identify what a reasonable policyholder would find as an unusual limitation of coverage 
requiring disclosure. 
 Despite the title of his article, Professor Keeton admitted that the decisions that could 
be most easily explained by the principle were the decisions that involved ambiguities.90  
Theoretically, the doctrine may work to the detriment of the insured.  If the expectation of 
coverage is not reasonable, even though the policy language is ambiguous, the policyholder’s 
unreasonable expectations would not be honored.   
It seems likely, however, that, even though not often expressed, there has 
always been an implicit understanding that ambiguities, which in most cases 
might be resolved in more than just one or the other of two ways,91 would be 
resolved favorably to the insured’s claim only if a reasonable person in his 
position would have expected coverage.92 
 
 Professor Keeton goes on to list examples of cases where the limits of ambiguity 
analysis are stretched, but do not explicitly go beyond it,93 those that have seemed to press 
beyond the rationale of ambiguity,94 and one in which the court invented an ambiguity and then 
construed the ambiguity against the insurer.95 He also lists cases that were decided under other 
theories, but would be better explained as having honored the insured’s reasonable 
expectations.96  Professor Keeton saw these expectation principles overlapping somewhat with 
detrimental reliance; however reliance may be caused by representations of agents.  Expectations 
in the cases cited supra were created by policy language and structure, marketing patterns by the 
insurer, and general practices.97  While reliance principles would focus on the individual 
policyholder, expectations principles reflect those that are common.98  In evaluating these cases, 
Professor Keeton does not decide whether they were rightly decided or whether an expectations 
analysis would produce the correct result.  He only analyzes them under the equitable theories 
employed by the courts, determines that those equitable theories do not adequately describe how 
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the courts reached their decisions, and found a better basis for the decisions under the reasonable 
expectations of the policyholders. 
 Professor Keeton next entertained the question of whether “rights at variance that 
would otherwise be recognized under the expectations principle [were] defeated by a 
policyholder’s specific knowledge of the policy provisions that limit protection in a surprising 
way.”99 Professor Keeton had stated earlier that insurer protection has limits if the provision is 
“fundamentally unconscionable because it misleads the great majority of policyholders.”100  This 
combines honoring reasonable expectations with disallowing unconscionable advantage to the 
insurer.101  Provisions that are subject to this analysis, because they are complex or otherwise 
unexpected, may not be effectively communicated to the general public by mass marketing; 
therefore, “no amount of care in drafting and in marketing will avoid the creation of reasonable 
expectations contrary to the literal terms of policy provisions.”102  According to Professor Keeton 
it would be unduly harsh for these knowledgeable policyholders to receive less coverage for the 
same premium as less knowledgeable policyholders.103  
 There has been much legal scholarship regarding the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations in the years following Professor Keeton’s article.  The doctrine has been described 
as exemplifying legal functionalism in insurance law in the ongoing debate with legal 
formalism.104  Its proponents have termed it a “stance insurance law should take in an ongoing – 
and still continuing – battle for the soul of contract law.”105  In the years after Professor Keeton’s 
article, functionalist courts adopted the doctrine.106  However, a number of states expressly 
rejected the doctrine,107 and even by the early 1990’s legal functionalism was in a resurgence, 
while the reasonable expectations doctrine was “experiencing a more limited judicial application 
than various commentators had initially predicted.”108 
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 For advocates of the doctrine, the focus is on the relationship of the parties.  The 
“tremendous imbalance in information, financial resources and litigation experience” allow 
insurance companies to hold tremendous power and control over the development of case law, 
the outcome of insurance litigation, and the resources and recourses available to insurance 
policyholders.109 The doctrine helps take the power away from the insurance companies to 
control policy drafting and insurance law.110  Traditional approaches for protecting policyholders 
are not enough in the face of insurance adhesion contracts.  Unconscionability requires egregious 
and unfair conduct by the insurer.  Estoppel requires a representation that the policyholder relied 
on.  Courts are not willing to apply implied warranty of fitness for intended use.111  Traditional 
protections are too limited.  They do not look at the relationship of the parties.  They do not look 
at the transaction as a whole. 
 Stephen J. Ware in his comment, A Critique Of The Reasonable Expectations 
Doctrine112 presents many of the arguments that the critics of the doctrine express.  Ware begins 
his analysis with a review of judicial remedies to adhesion contracts, of which contra 
preferentem is the most commonly used.113  He notes that it has been transformed from a rule of 
last resort to a substantive tool used to systematically construe the insurance contract in the 
policyholder’s favor.114  Other doctrines in use include unconscionability, estoppel, waiver, 
implied warrantee of fitness, reformation and public policy.115 
 Ware identifies three versions of the reasonable expectations doctrine as applied by 
various courts:116 
1.  Construing ambiguities in contract language to meet the reasonable expectations of the 
policyholder; 
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2.  Refusing to enforce policy provisions in fine print that limit coverage granted in a part of the 
contract that is more prominent; and  
3.  Honoring the reasonable expectations of the policyholder, because those expectations arise 
from outside the contract and come from the insurer.117 
 The ambiguity version of the doctrine is no different than contra preferentem.  It just 
uses the insured’s reasonable expectations as a reason for its particular construction.  As Ware 
notes, 
The states using the ambiguity version of the reasonable expectations doctrine 
are not analyzing cases any differently from states that reject the doctrine; 
both sets of courts claim that contractual language is crucial to their decisions, 
and both fabricate ambiguities or “read” the policy as a layperson would in 
order to provide coverage unwarranted by a precise parsing of the policy.118 
 
 Under the fine print version, unambiguous policy provisions will be overcome by the 
policyholder’s reasonable expectations by reason of the structure of the contract itself.  “Terms 
that an insured would see in glancing at the policy are generally enforced, but those that are 
‘buried’ in many pages of ‘fine print’ are likely to be disregarded.”119  This is more in line with 
Professor Keeton’s description of the doctrine, because the court recognizes a policyholder’s 
rights that are at variance with unambiguous, explicit policy language.  It assumes that 
policyholders do not read their policies or if they do only at a cursory level.120  Most often the 
offending provisions are exclusions of coverage.  Ware argues that, as a result of courts’ hostility 
to policy exclusions, insurers may change the way they draft policies, to the detriment of 
insureds.121  Instead of granting broad coverage and limiting portions of that coverage with 
specific exclusions, insurers could start with a baseline of no coverage and only grant coverage 
for specific situations.  Arguably this would take away coverage for instances that are not 
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anticipated by either the insured or insurer, because they are not expressly mentioned in the 
policy.122 
 The whole transaction version does not look at the contract language at all, but at the 
circumstances surrounding transaction, such as marketing and general practices of the insurer.123  
This is distinguished from equitable estoppel, because there is no detrimental reliance 
requirement with this reasonable expectations version.124  This version is also within Professor 
Keeton’s description, because unambiguous policy language can be disregarded. 
 Ward, then, addresses what he identifies are the three main reasons proponents give for 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations:  not receiving the policy until after entering into the 
contract, the inequality of bargaining power, and the complexity of the insurance contracts. 
 Ware contends that a policyholder not receiving the policy until after agreeing to buy 
the insurance and paying the first premium does not justify the doctrine.  The process of the 
transaction makes the proposed insured the offeror.  When the offeree, the insurance company, 
accepts the offer, it delivers the policy contract.  If the insurance company rejects the offer, the 
entire amount of any premium paid is refunded and the insured is in the same position he was in 
prior to the transaction.  Likewise, the insured, after receiving the policy contract, can cancel and 
receive a full refund of premium or at least a pro rata amount based on the amount of time 
coverage was effective.125 
 It is a common argument among expectations proponents that an influential reason for 
the doctrine is the unequal bargaining power between the insurance company and the potential 
insured.126  However, both the insurer and the insured benefit economically from the use of 
standardized contracts.  Because the insurer is freed from drafting individual contracts with each 
potential policyholder, its transaction costs are drastically minimized.  Because those transaction 
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costs are minimized, the public is able to afford insurance coverage so that its risks are 
effectively transferred to the insurance company.  The primary reason, therefore, of standardized 
insurance contracts are to reducing transaction costs and not to take advantage of unequal 
bargaining power.127 
 The last justification is that the insurance contracts are long, complex and written by the 
insurer.  This justification is based on the premise that insurers will only include terms in the 
insurance policies that are favorable to them.128   Wade argues that this does not make sense from 
an economical and marketing standpoint.  He quotes Judge Richard Posner for the position that if 
a seller offers unattractive terms, another seller will offer more attractive terms in order to gain 
market share.  After acknowledging that this is an oversimplification in the insurance context, 
Ware discusses the various mechanisms of price/policy provision mix; “easy to read” policy 
summaries, overt comparisons by insurers with their competitors, fostering goodwill by ignoring 
certain policy provisions, and developing a good claims-adjusting reputation in order to 
distinguish themselves.129  
 Ware finishes this section by proposing that governmental, both administrative and 
judicial, interference is part of the problem of why and how insurance contracts became long and 
complex.  As courts construe policy language, insurance contract drafters attempt to isolate the 
legal words and phrases used in order to clarify the policy language according to the court ruling.  
The drafters’ attempts result in longer and more complex policies.130  Ware contends that courts 
could help clarify policy language by intervening less, not more.  The use of the reasonable 
expectations doctrine causes drafters to make policies more complicated in order to attempt to 
clarify the policy language under the court ruling.131  
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 Ware ends with an analysis of freedom of contract, which is a favorite point among 
critics of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.132 Ware contends that “even if bargaining 
power or contract terms did favor the insurer, one would still have to reject ‘freedom of contract’ 
and weaken the rule of law in order to justify the reasonable expectations doctrine.”133  The basis 
of freedom of contract is the notion that contractual duties are not imposed on a party by force or 
coercion.  Both the insurer, by obtaining licensure from the state and soliciting customers, and 
the proposed insured, by seeking to purchase insurance, enter into a contractual relationship with 
its obligations and duties.  The logical conclusion is their rights and duties are determined by the 
language of the written contract.134  However, the doctrine of reasonable expectations imposes 
on the insurer additional duties not found in the contract.  Advocates of the doctrine contend that 
this is appropriate, because the policyholder has not truly consented to the duties in the 
contract.135 
 On the other hand, ascribing to the traditional rule that one who signs a contract assents 
to its terms promotes equality, freedom, and wealth.136  By viewing the policyholder’s signature 
as an assent to the contract terms, the interpretation of the contract is made clear and objective, 
and the law is applied equally and not on the whim of a judge or jury.137  Freedom is served by 
objective and clear rules so that “[m]an is free if he needs to obey no person but solely the 
laws.”138  Finally, wealth is promoted because economic actors have confidence that they can 
predict how a state will act with its coercive powers.139  Nothing in freedom of contract states 
that each term must be bargained and negotiated.  Freedom of contract allows parties to enter 
into form contracts as long as they are not defrauded or forced. 
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VI.  Jurisdictional Differences 
 This paper will not attempt to inventory every jurisdiction and attempt to classify it.  
Many of the articles cited herein provide such lists as they stood at various times.  However, a 
review California in some detail with more cursory reviews of New Jersey, Florida, 
Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wisconsin is appropriate to show how the doctrine is treated differently 
around the country. 
 
A.  California 
 One of the foundational cases that Professor Keeton relied on to show the reasonable 
expectations principle was Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.140  In this famous case of the vending 
machine airline insurance, the California Supreme Court stated 
In this type of standardized contract, sold by a vending machine, the insured 
may reasonably expect coverage for the whole trip which he inserted in the 
policy, including reasonable substituted transportation necessitated by 
emergency.141 
 
It was charged by the Court that ambiguity in the language is determined in view of the 
policyholders “knowledge and understanding as a reasonable layman, his normal expectation of 
the extent of coverage of the policy . . . .”142 
 One of the most influential cases in the development of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine is Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co.143  Gray involved the insurance company denying a defense 
to Mr. Gray for a third-party suit.  Writing for the Court, Justice Tobriner stated that the meaning 
of the contract comes from the reasonable expectations of the insured as opposed to the words 
used in the insurance contract. 
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Although courts have long followed the basic precept that they would look to 
the words of the contract to find the meaning which the parties expected from 
them, they have also applied the doctrine of the adhesion contract to insurance 
policies, holding that in view of the disparate bargaining status of the parties 
we must ascertain that meaning of the contract which the insured would 
reasonably expect.144 
 
 It appears at the time of Professor Keeton’s article, California already had a fairly well 
developed doctrine in which the insured’s reasonable expectation could prevail over policy 
language that was unambiguous on its face. 
 In 1992, the California Supreme Court decided Bank of the West v. Superior Court.145  
The case involved construing the terms “unfair competition” and “advertising injury.”146  While 
admitting that insurance contracts have “special features,” ordinary contract interpretation rules 
apply.147  If the contract language is clear, it governs; however, “[i]f the terms of a promise are in 
any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor 
believed, at the time of making it, that the promisee understood it.”148 
 There are two significant developments in this statement of insurance contract 
interpretation.  First, the Court seems to say that any reasonable expectations analysis is 
inapplicable without first there being an ambiguity in the contract language.  This would back 
away from the Gray Court’s strong statement in favor of reasonable expectations.  This is also 
not in keeping with Professor Keeton’s presentment of not needing an ambiguity to apply the 
doctrine.  Secondly, when the doctrine is applied, it is viewed from the insurer’s perspective.  
The question is not what the insured reasonably expected coverage to be, but what the insurer 
believed the insured expected.  This is a significant shift, and is similar to the standard in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 relating to “Standardized Agreements.”149 
 California’s analytical frame-work for interpreting insurance contracts now had a three-
step sequential process that used reasonable expectations as only a part, not the overriding 
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theme.150  “1) [L]ook to the plain meaning of the policy language as an initial inquiry; 2) a 
consideration of the insured’s reasonable expectation (from the insurer’s perspective) of 
coverage; 3) and the doctrine that ambiguous policies are strictly construed against the drafter of 
the policy.”151 
 As one Associate Justice of the California Court of Appeals put it, 
In California, policy ambiguities can no longer be resolved in the insured’s 
favor unless, in the context of the circumstances, coverage is consistent with the 
insured’s objectively reasonable expectations in light of (1) the language of the 
entire policy, (2) the total circumstances of the particular case and (3) common 
sense.  This is a much tougher standard and provides the courts with a powerful 
tool to broadly examine and evaluate those expectations.  Indeed it can fairly be 
said that in California the doctrine of reasonable expectations has moved from a 
rationale justifying a broad, pro-insured rule of construction to an analytical tool 
which will be utilized in many cases to deny coverage where it previously 
would have been recognized.152 
 
 In MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch.,153 the Court arguably placed more emphasis on the 
reasonable expectations of the insured, but still applied the three-step analysis, and some argued 
that the test did not survive MacKinnon.154  One year later in Hansen v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp.,155 
the California Court of Appeals reviewed the declarations page of a Business Auto policy to 
determine the limits of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.  The limits for 
underinsured motorist coverage were not clear on the face of the declarations page.156  The 
insurance company proffered an interpretation which stated that the limits for underinsured 
motorist coverage were the same as uninsured motorist coverage, $100,000, and the court found 
that interpretation reasonable.157  The Hansen’s asserted interpretation was that the limit was the 
same as the liability coverage limit, $1,000,000.158  The court found the Hansen’s interpretation 
unreasonable; therefore the insurance company’s reasonable interpretation prevailed.159  
Interestingly, the court used Wilkie to show that the doctrine of reasonable expectations to 
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overcome unambiguous policy language is not universally accepted, and underscored that 
California did not follow that version of the doctrine.160 
 It appears, therefore, that California, while using reasonable expectations in its formula, 
is with a growing number of states that have changed from the “pure” Keetonian version of the 
doctrine to one that requires an ambiguity before the insured’s reasonable expectations are 
considered. 
 
B.  Other Jurisdictions 
 In Minnesota, the high water mark for the doctrine was in Atwater Creamery Co. v. 
Western Nat’l. Mut. Ins. Co.161 in which Minnesota’s Supreme Court refused to honor clear, 
unambiguous policy language in the definition of “burglary” to find coverage based on the 
insured’s reasonable expectations.  However, in Univ. of Minnesota v. Royal Ins. Co.,162 the 
Court limited Atwater Creamery to state that the doctrine has no place where the policy language 
is clear and unambiguous.  Subsequent Minnesota cases have restricted the doctrine even further 
to applying it only to instances of hidden exclusions.163 
 New Jersey had the most cases in Professor Keeton’s article showing that reasonable 
expectations could overcome seemingly clear policy language.  However, in Benjamin Moore & 
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 164 the New Jersey Supreme Court did not use the doctrine to 
overcome clear and unambiguous policy language and applied a $10,000 deductible for each 
consecutive policy for a claim of long-term lead-based paint exposure.  This was over a vigorous 
dissent which would have applied the doctrine165 and strenuous urging by some in the New 
Jersey Bar.166 
 23
 Florida is a jurisdiction that has completely rejected the doctrine in all its forms.  This 
was made clear in Deni v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.167  In construing a pollution exclusion 
provision, the Court stated 
We decline to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations.  There is no need 
for it if the policy provisions are ambiguous because in Florida ambiguities are 
construed against the insurer.  To apply the doctrine to an unambiguous 
provision would be to rewrite the contract and the basis upon which the 
premiums are charged . . . . The reasonable expectation doctrine requires a court 
to rewrite an insurance contract which does not meet popular expectations.  
Such rewriting is done regardless of the bargain entered into by the parties of 
the contract. 
* * * 
Construing policies upon a determination as to whether the insured’s subjective 
expectations are reasonable can only lead to uncertainty and unnecessary 
litigation.168 
 
 In Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,169 which is cited approvingly in Deni, 
supra, even in the absence of full development of other equitable doctrines, the Utah Supreme 
Court refused to adopt such a “new and potentially sweeping equitable doctrine.”170 
 Pennsylvania, a quick adherent to the reasonable expectations doctrine, started by 
allowing reasonable expectations to overcome unambiguous contract language.171  However, it has 
retreated, like many former strong adherents, to relegating it to ambiguous policy provisions.  
Pennsylvania’s current position on the doctrine has been summarized thusly: 
1. If the language is clear and unambiguous, the court will enforce it even though it works 
against the insured’s reasonable expectation. 
2. If policy language is ambiguous, it will be construed in favor of the insured. 
3. If an insurer accepts payment for a policy and cannot show that the insured did not have a 
reasonable basis for having an expectation of coverage, those reasonable expectations will be 
honored. 
4. Reasonable expectations of coverage will overcome a clear policy exclusion if: 
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 a. Specific insurance was applied for, but the issued policy is materially different; 
 b. Misrepresentation by the insurer or its agent and justifiable reliance by the insured on 
those misrepresentations; and 
 c. The insurance company failed to fulfill a duty to the policyholder, and that failure 
caused a denial of coverage.172 
 Wisconsin has not expressly adopted or rejected the doctrine.  As described in a comment 
in the Marquette Law Review,173 the majority of Wisconsin Supreme Court cases have used the 
doctrine as a way to construe policy ambiguities in favor of the reasonable expectations of the 
insured.174  However, in a confusing jumble of opinions, the Court has applied four different 
approaches to the doctrine causing one of the justices to comment that “[t]he majority’s application 
of the principle of reasonable expectations is not entirely clear.  The principle has more than one 
meaning.”175 
 As the foregoing analysis shows, Michigan is not alone in its repudiation of the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations.  In fact, the vast majority of those jurisdictions that do use an 
expectation analysis, do so primarily, if not exclusively, to resolve ambiguous policy language.  
Many states, like Michigan prior to Wilkie, had not addressed the doctrine specifically to either 
reject or adopt it.  The trend is that those states that have used the pure, strong Keetonian version 
of the doctrine have tended to back away from it, and some who have adopted it as a tool for 
resolving ambiguities have abandoned it, because it was indistinguishable from contra 
preferentem. 
 
VI.  The Michigan Supreme Court Misapplies Its Wilkie Analysis 
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 Two years after deciding Wilkie, the Michigan Supreme Court decided Rory v. 
Continental Ins. Co.176  The majority opinion, authored by Justice Robert P. Young, constituted the 
same justices as Wilkie.177 
 The case involved an Uninsured Motorist coverage provision which limited the time the 
insured could make a claim or file an action for Uninsured Motorist benefits to one year from the 
date of the accident.  Plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident with a vehicle driven by 
Charlene Haynes on May 15, 1998.178  Plaintiffs filed a third-party suit against Haynes in 
September 1999, well within the statute of limitations.179  Sometime after the suit was filed, 
plaintiffs discovered that Haynes was not insured.  On March 14, 2000, plaintiffs submitted a 
claim for Uninsured Motorist benefits under their auto insurance policy with the defendant.180  
Continental (hereinafter CNA) denied the claim based on the one-year limitation in the policy.  In 
August 2000, plaintiffs filed suit against CNA.181 
 CNA filed a motion for summary disposition relying on the policy provision.  The trial 
court denied the motion, stating that the provision was an “unenforceable adhesion clause,” and 
constituted a “significant reduction” in the time plaintiffs would otherwise be required to file an 
action against the tortfeasor.182 
 CNA filed an appeal, and the Court of Appeals upheld the denial of the motion.183  The 
court stated that this was not a case of ambiguity or public policy,184 but of reasonableness.185  The 
court held that the one-year limitation was unreasonable, because it is not enough time to 
determine if the plaintiff has suffered a serious injury and whether the tortfeasor is insured and 
imposed a three-year limitation.186  There is no mention in the opinion regarding the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations or that plaintiffs expected coverage in some way based on the doctrine. 
 Justice Young187 framed the issues of this case as: 
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(1)  [A]re insurance contracts subject to a standard of enforcement different 
from that applicable to other contracts, and 
(2)  under what conditions may a court disregard and refuse to enforce 
unambiguous contract terms[.]188 
 
 The Court held that standards of enforcement for insurance contracts are no different than 
any other contract, and that absent a violation of law or the applicability of one of the traditional 
contract defenses, unambiguous contract language will be enforced.189  It should be noticed that 
the holding regarding unambiguous terms is different than in Wilkie, in that there is no mention of 
public policy as a defense initially.190  Secondarily, the Court held that the legislature has given the 
task to evaluate policy contracts for reasonableness to the Commissioner of the Office of Financial 
and Insurance Services, exclusively. 
 Initially, there is discussion that if there was a statute of limitations that would apply, it 
would be the six-year contractual statute,191 not the three-year injury statute.192  This line of 
reasoning is not logical.  The contractual statute of limitations limits the ability to bring suit for 
specific performance or breach of contract.  There is no language that expresses or implies that it 
applies to filing a claim against coverage under an insurance policy.  However, it would limit the 
insured to six years in order to file a suit to enforce the terms of an insurance contract or a breach 
of contract suit regarding an insurance contract.  Uninsured Motorist coverage is a derivative 
coverage.  It is only applicable when there is a valid actionable claim against the driver and/or 
owner of the motor vehicle which caused the accident.  The injured party can file a valid claim or 
file suit against the tortfeasor up to three years after the accident.  Therefore, contrary to the 
Court’s contention, the Court of Appeal’s application of the three-year limitation is logical and 
conforms with the purpose of Uninsured Motorist coverage and the applicable statute of limitations 
enacted by the legislature.   
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 Despite Justice Young’s adherence to the stance that public policy is the product of the 
legislative and executive branches of government,193 the apparent public policy statement of the 
legislature is that those who are injured by a negligent driver of an automobile in Michigan, and 
whose injuries satisfy the threshold for compensability,194 have three years in which to determine if 
they have the basis to file a good faith action for compensation of their injuries.195  Even though, 
admittedly, Uninsured Motorist coverage is not mandated by the Michigan No-Fault Act, the 
ability of an insured to take advantage of the coverage is directly affected by the injury threshold 
requirement in the Act.  Michigan is not a state that gives those injured in an automobile accident 
an unfettered right to sue the tortfeasor no matter how minor the injury may be.  In such a state, a 
shorter statute of limitation may be appropriate, as the extent of the injury can be determined 
during the course of the litigation.  A one-year limitation on the ability of an injured party to file a 
claim or suit under uninsured motorist coverage in Michigan is unreasonable, and it can be argued 
unconscionable. 
 In the reasonableness discussion of insurance terms, the Court states that an adhesion 
contract is just that:  a contract; and “adhesion” is just a label for the type of contract.196  They are 
not subject to any special rules.197  The Court, then, cites Wilkie and uses a similar analytical 
process, to state that only traditional contract construction doctrines apply, mistakenly equating the 
analysis in this case with the doctrine of reasonable expectations.198  The error in the Court’s 
analysis is that there is not a claim that the policy term was ambiguous, or that the plaintiff’s 
reasonably expected coverage.  The provision is inapposite to the express statutory granting of a 
three-year statute of limitation to file suit for injuries upon which Uninsured Motorist coverage is 
predicated.  The Court’s analysis is in direct contradiction to the public policy statement by the 
 28
legislature that injured parties have three years in which to file an action to be compensated for 
their injuries. 
 The Court relies on MCL 500.2236 for the contention that the public policy statement of 
the legislature is to reserve all inquiries as to reasonableness of insurance policy provisions to the 
Commissioner of the Office of Insurance and Financial Services.199  As Justice Kelly argued, in 
dissent, the statute requires the Commissioner to approve insurance contracts as long as they do 
not violate the law.  Reasonableness applies to the discretion the Commissioner has as a basis for 
disapproving or withdrawing approval for insurance contract provisions.200  The statute does not 
say, or even imply, that the sole arbiter of reasonableness of all the insurance contract language 
used in this state is the Commissioner to the exclusion of the Judiciary. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 The doctrine of reasonable expectations, as a principled, well-developed and clear body 
of law is lacking.  Despite Professor Keeton’s clear declaration of the doctrine in 1970, the 37 
years since have not supplied a cohesive national consensus on the factors, steps in the analysis, or 
even the general applicability of the doctrine.  Michigan is not alone in its repudiation of the 
doctrine.  It is following the national trend away from the strong, Keetonian version of the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations. 
 However, the Court erred in applying the same analytical framework in Rory.  The 
challenge to the policy provision was not based on the reasonable expectations of the insured, but 
on the unreasonableness of the provision itself.  Unlike the Court of Appeals, I argue that this case 
was about public policy.  The contract provision violated the legislative public policy of providing 
injured parties three years to determine whether they have an actionable injury under the Michigan 
 29
No-Fault Act and file an action in order to be compensated for that injury.  The Court misapplied 
Wilkie in its analysis in upholding the one-year limitation. 
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